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THE MODERN CHURCHMAN

A monthly Magazine to maintain the cause of
TRUTH, FREEDOM, and COMPREHENSIVENESS
in the Anglican Communion.

EDITOR: H. D. A. MAJOR, B.D.

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1.—To affirm the continuous and progressive character of the revelation given by the Holy Spirit in the spheres of knowledge and of conduct.
2.—To maintain the right and duty of the Church of England to restate her doctrines from time to time in accordance with this revelation.
3.—To uphold the historic comprehensiveness of the Church of England.
4.—To defend the freedom of responsible students, clerical as well as lay, in their work of criticism and research.
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THE

MODERN CHURCHMAN

By identifying the new learning with heresy, you make orthodoxy synonymous with ignorance.—*Erasmus.*

A State without the means of change is without the means of its conservation.—*Edmund Burke.*

No. 4. JULY, 1922. Vol. XII.

SIGNS OF THE TIMES

Modernism in America.

Organization should be in the realm of ideals what protection should be in the realm of commerce. It should protect the ideal until it is firmly planted and able to hold its own against reasonable and righteous competition. Liberal Churchmen have so strong a belief in the truth and its power to prevail, and so great a dislike of organization which seems to them to end by strangling the ideal it was created to protect and propagate, that they either refuse to organize at all, or else organize without enthusiasm and energy. What they ought to do is to organize with energy, and resolve to 'scrap' the organization ruthlessly as soon as the ideal seems able to prevail without the organization. The Churchmen's Union was formed in 1898, and those who know its history will agree that it has served a useful purpose, although not a few of its leading members deplore that circumstances have compelled them to organize. It is interesting to observe that liberal American Anglicans now feel the need of following our example. An influential committee, consisting of the Revs. Samuel McComb, D.D., W. Austin Smith, D.D., Hugh Birckhead, D.D., W. Russell Bowie, D.D., Dr. Barnwell, and the Rev. Charles Clingman, has been appointed to take steps to form an American Modern Churchmen's Union. The Acting Secretary is Professor S. McComb, D.D., Episcopal Theolo-

gical School, Cambridge, Massachusetts. The programme is outlined as follows :—

Believing that Christ is the Way, the Truth, and the Life, it is our purpose

1. To affirm the continuous activity of the Holy Spirit in all spheres of life and thought in harmony with His promise that the Spirit shall guide the Church into all truth.
2. To maintain the right of interpretation of the embodiments of our faith in accordance with the results of modern science and of biblical and historical criticism.
3. To promote a spiritual and ethical evangelism among the unchurched classes of our population.
4. To encourage greater freedom and elasticity in the worship of the Church in order to adapt it to the thought and need of the times.
5. To advance, as an aid to the ultimate reunion of Christendom, co-operation and fellowship between the Protestant Episcopal Church and other Protestant Churches.
6. To emphasize afresh the nature of the Christian life as personal fellowship with God, and to study with sympathy those movements and tendencies of thought which are mystical in character.
7. To further the application of Christian principles in every sphere of social and industrial life.

The *Modern Churchman* has been selected as the organ of the American Modern Churchmen's Union, and the following scholars have consented to act as the American Advisory Editorial Board :—

Rev. E. S. Drown, D.D., Professor of Systematic Theology, Cambridge Episcopal Theological School.
Rev. J. MacBride Sterrett, D.D., formerly Professor of Philosophy at George Washington University.
Rev. Frederick Palmer, D.D., Editor of *Harvard Theological Review*.
Rev. Elwood Worcester, D.D., Ph.D., Rector of Emmanuel Church, Boston (Mass.).
Rev. W. Austin Smith, D.D., Editor of *The Churchman* (New York).
Rev. Samuel McComb, M.A., D.D., Professor of Pastoral Theology in the Cambridge Episcopal Theological School.
Rev. Canon H. N. Arrowsmith, B.D., Hon. Sec., 204 St. Martin's Road, Guilford, Baltimore, Maryland, U.S.A.

Articles by American writers must be sent to the Secretary, Canon Arrowsmith.

We wish the new organization every success, and have reason to believe that it will find much useful work to do in trying to win educated Americans to the religion of Christ by presenting that religion in a way which can appeal to every side of their higher nature. In response to the insistent need for closer friendship and co-operation between America and England in the interests of world-peace the American Modern

Churchmen's Union can play a helpful part in drawing the two great English-speaking communities closer together.

The Forty Stripes save One.

At Canterbury in January last the Principals of our Theological Colleges passed a resolution urging the practical abolition of the XXXIX Articles. This came as no surprise to us. Ordinands have many important subjects to study to-day, and little time to do it in, and the Articles seem neither attractive nor important to the ordinary candidate for orders. But it did surprise us that Dr. Henson in his recent sermon in Westminster Abbey should advocate the revision of the Articles.

There are no English Churchmen to-day, except some old-fashioned Evangelicals, who, if the Articles were to be re-written, would not gladly see some alterations made in them. Such a statement as that Christ took his flesh and bones into heaven at his Ascension, offends our scientific sense: such a statement as that good works done before Justification have the nature of sin, offends our moral sense: such a statement as that the Churches of Jerusalem, Alexandria, and Antioch, as also the Church of Rome, have erred not only in their manner of living and ceremonies, but also in matters of faith, offends our sense of Christian charity. Of course it is true, but why say it to-day, especially when we wish to establish cordial relations with the Greek Church. But it is one thing to desire certain statements excised from the Articles, and it is quite another to embark on a campaign of revision. It seems to us that here the game of revision is not worth the candle.

The Articles give practically no trouble to the laity. They only hear them read by their new incumbent on the Sunday morning after his induction, and that event comes very seldom. Moreover, if they contain statements which as a layman remarked 'seem rather weird,' the declaration that 'the Riches and Goods of Christians are not common, as touching the right, title, and possession of the same,' coming as it does towards the end of the reading always reassures them by the appeal which it makes to their political principles and strong common sense.

As for the clergy the Articles sit very lightly on them. The Anglo-Catholics, since Tract 90 revealed it, have regarded the Articles as 'patient of a Catholic interpretation'; the Liberals, since the alteration in the form of subscription in the sixties, know that all they are required to do is to give a general assent to the doctrine of the Articles; the Evangelicals regard the Articles as their main protection against Rome. Why then tinker with them? It would be a terribly controversial proceeding, and would occupy much precious time. Better than any attempted revision would be the drawing up of a short and simple *alternative* formulary stating the position of the English Church as Scriptural, Apostolic, Catholic, and Reformed. We believe that all liturgical and doctrinal reform to-day had best proceed by *permissive* alterations and *alternative* forms.

The view, which regards the revision of the Articles as a remedy for disloyalty and disorder in the Church, is a mistaken one. Loyalty to the Church's doctrine and ideals is not to be secured by the machinery of subscribing to formularies. Subscription as a disciplinary device is out of date. Loyalty cannot be attained by subscription, but only by education. Education is a laborious and expensive remedy, but it is infallible. The spectacular devices of ecclesiastical legislation and episcopal denunciation are powerless in the presence of a policy which inculcates ideals in minds moulded by association to receive them. If the Bishop of Durham and his friends will give thought to the securing of the right kind of ordinand, and raise the necessary money for training him, the dangers of the present situation would slowly but surely pass away. Our Anglo-Catholic brethren especially have set us a noble example in their care for the training of ordinands, and until our liberally-minded bishops are willing to take this matter seriously in hand, and organise the selection and training of the type of man they desire, in the way they desire, they are not likely to secure in any adequate quantity ordinands whom it will give them any heartfelt satisfaction to ordain or who they will feel assured have any deep and understanding love and loyalty to the Church of England.

Reunion by Retrogression.

The following Declaration of Faith signed by Bishop Gore, the Abbot of Pershore, and other Anglo-Catholic leaders has been sent to the Patriarch of Constantinople :—

WE, the undersigned, being priests of the English Church, earnestly desiring to promote an understanding with our brethren of the Eastern-Orthodox Churches, and rejoicing that in God's providence there are manifold evidences of the growth of sympathy and mutual love on both sides, now in all humility write to your Holiness and to the Holy Synod, in order to set forth plainly that which we hold to be the genuine teaching of the English Church on certain matters of faith, touching which we gather from the utterances of Eastern-Orthodox hierarchs and theologians that they would welcome some explicit statement from us.

1. We affirm that the one saving faith, in which it is the will of God that all Christians should be held together in the unity of the spirit and the bond of peace, is the faith of the undivided Church of Christ, which faith is set forth in the Holy Scriptures, has been handed on by the Holy Fathers in their writings and by the tradition of the Church, and in opposition to the negations and corruptions of heretics has been reaffirmed and safeguarded by Oecumenical Councils through the operation of the Holy Ghost.

2. We affirm that, notwithstanding individual departures therefrom, this faith has not been forsaken by the English Church.

3. We affirm that each particular Church is rightly independent (*autokephalos*) and self-administered (*autodioiketos*) in matters which are not essential to the faith or practice of the Universal Church.

4. We hold that an Oecumenical Council is the supreme tribunal of the One Holy Catholic and Apostolic Church, and that the dogmatic decrees of the Councils which have been accepted as Oecumenical by the whole Church are incontrovertible and binding on all Christians.

5. As touching any matters in which the Church of England may seem in the opinion of Eastern theologians to have departed from the dogmatic decrees of the Oecumenical Councils, we declare that we know of no such departure, and that we accept the faith as expounded by those Councils.

6. Though the number of the Sacraments has not been formally fixed either by tradition from the Apostles or by any decision of an Oecumenical Council, we agree that in Baptism, the Eucharist, Confirmation, Penance, Orders, Matrimony, and Unction some special and appropriate grace is given by God to man as ordained either by Christ or by His Apostles acting on the authority which He gave them ; and we adhere to the custom of calling these seven rites specifically sacraments.

7. We affirm the essential necessity of the Sacrament of Order according to the institution of Christ, the practice of the Apostles, and the constant tradition of the Church. This is secured in the Churches of the Anglican Communion by the transmission of the several orders of the hierarchy by the imposition of the hands of the bishops, to whom it has been transmitted in like manner by an uninterrupted succession from the days of the Apostles.

WE, the undersigned, therefore, hold that our Lord, through the ministry of the successors of the Apostles, has conferred on us and on all the members of the clergy of the Anglican Communion the Sacrament of

Order, with the purpose that we, who are priests, should (a) preach and teach the word of God; (b) offer the unbloody sacrifice of the Eucharist for both the living and the departed; (c) sacramentally absolve sinners who repent and confess their sins; and (d) otherwise minister to the flock of Christ according to the ancient faith and practice of the Universal Church.

8. We affirm that, by consecration in the Eucharist, the bread and the wine, being blessed by the life-giving power of the Holy Spirit, are changed and become the true body and the true blood of Christ, and as such are given to and received by the faithful. We hold, therefore, that Christ thus present is to be adored. As to the actual manner of the change, and of the mode of the presence, no doctrine on this point is laid down by any Oecumenical Council, and, therefore, while believing the fact, we do not venture to define the mode. There is here a divine mystery which passes human understanding.

9. We agree with the Holy Orthodox Eastern Church that honour should be given to the holy and ever-virgin Mother of God and the Saints departed; that there is a legitimate use of sacred images; and that, alike in our public and in our private prayers, we should ask for the benefit of the intercession of the saints.

10. We account the Thirty-nine Articles of Religion as a document of secondary importance concerned with local controversies of the sixteenth century, and to be interpreted in accordance with the faith of that Universal Church of which the English Church is but a part.

This Declaration no doubt represents correctly the views of its signatories, but it would be absurd to suppose that either historically, officially, or generally, it represents the English Church. It conflicts acutely with our formularies and our characteristic English teaching. It would certainly cause our Reformation Fathers to turn in their graves if anything terrestrial could do that. It is hardly to be supposed that the representatives of the Greek Orthodox Church will regard it as anything more than what it is—an Anglican party declaration. It is not only much too partisan, but also much too vague to form the basis of reunion among the sticklers for historic orthodoxy. What does the phrase 'dogmatic decrees of the Oecumenical Councils' mean? Do our Anglo-Catholic brethren reckon them to be four or seven or twenty-seven? The phrase 'the honour' given 'to the holy and ever-virgin Mother of God and the Saints departed' is also vague. 'Honour' may be reverence or it may be adoration. The phrase 'a legitimate use of sacred images' is also vague. Leo the Isaurian held that 'a legitimate use of sacred images' was as firewood or road-metal, and many of our English Churchmen have agreed with him both in theory and practice as our

sorrowing archaeologists know. The phrase 'the intercession of the Saints' is precise enough, but our Article XXII classes it as 'a fond thing vainly invented, and grounded upon no warranty of Scripture, but rather repugnant to the Word of God.'

It is not surprising that the signatories conclude their Declaration by affirming that the XXXIX Articles are of secondary importance, and are out of date. But can we feel sure, while some of our Anglicans are striving to compel the English Church to go back to the Middle Ages, that the more intelligent and educated of Greek ecclesiastics will favour English efforts to achieve ecclesiastical retrogression, especially when the ultimate object of those efforts is to secure union with Rome?

The eyes of the Greek orthodox leaders are fixed on us to-day not because we are mediaeval, but because we are modern. They regard us with interest because we seem able to live in a modern world not as secularists but as Christians: we seem able to admit the conclusions of modern science and modern history, and yet to hold fast to the truth of our religion; we seem to be able to embrace the world of new knowledge and new thought, and yet not to renounce the faith of Jesus Christ. If we can show them how to do this, they will be grateful to us. But although it may comfort their obscurantist rank and file to tell them that some of us sympathise with their mediaevalisms, it will not afford either help or gratification to their more far-sighted leaders.

Modern Churchmen desire inter-communion with Greek Christians as with all others, but they know that inter-communion of an enduring kind is not to be secured by retrogression in a world which, at least in the sphere of knowledge, is moving forward.

In Defence of Girton.

We are glad to observe that the April *Bristol Diocesan Review* has admitted an article by Canon Barnes, F.R.S., in defence of the Girton Conference. We would gladly, if space permitted, re-publish the whole article, for it seems to us to put the case for the Conference with insight and lucidity. The

following paragraphs bring out some of the more important points in a way that plain people can understand.

'Girton was really significant. Its importance has not been overrated. It was the first attempt in this country to show in a popular way how Christian theology must be presented in the light of modern New Testament study.

'For more than a generation the foremost scholars of the Christian world have been applying the methods of literary and historical criticism, which were perfected during the nineteenth century, to the New Testament Scriptures. At length a large measure of agreement has been reached. The earliest biography of Jesus is contained in the Gospel of St. Mark. St. Luke used St. Mark's Gospel, as did also the author of the Gospel which bears the name of St. Matthew. This Gospel was probably written some fifty years after the Crucifixion, and we can say with considerable certainty that its author was a Jewish follower of Christ, who, in the Sermon on the Mount, incorporated a very early and supremely valuable record of the teaching of Jesus due to St. Matthew the Apostle. To St. Paul we owe a great development of Christian theology; and this development is carried still further in that meditation upon, and interpretation of, the Christ which we call the Gospel according to St. John. Such are some generally accepted results of modern New Testament study.'

'These results can no longer be ignored by Church divines. The new knowledge is penetrating everywhere. Throughout England there has been a great educational advance during the last half-century. A wholly new and powerfully influential class of elementary and secondary teachers, the majority of them women, has come into existence. They, and educated people in all ranks of society, hear of the new conclusions. The information they acquire is often vague or inaccurate, derived from secularist propaganda or from the public press. But because the Churches are silent, such educated people think that the Churches are afraid. The result is a disastrous and widespread alienation from institutional Christianity.

'Modern Churchmen believe that silence is a mistake and that the Christian faith will be the stronger when Christian theology has absorbed modern knowledge. Just as St. Thomas Aquinas baptised Aristotle into Christ, so modern Churchmen would baptise into Christ modern science and our new understanding of the Scriptures. They are loyal to the position established at the Reformation that Christian doctrine must be founded on the Bible. "Holy Scripture containeth all things necessary to salvation so that whatsoever is not read therein, *nor may be proved thereby*, is not to be required of any man that it should be believed as an article of the Faith or be thought requisite or necessary to salvation." Our Modernists combine this principle with the new understanding of the Bible given by modern scholarship; and thus seek to show men how they can still worship Christ in spirit and in truth. It is their confident appeal to truth that gives their position its strength. Like men of science they try to express their ideas in simple clear language. They are resolved not to obscure issues or evade difficulties. Undoubtedly those to whom old formulæ, even when imperfectly understood, have acquired by use sacred associations, are distressed when these formulæ are replaced by modern expressions. But thoughtful men and women welcome the change. They agree with Professor Harnack that "even should piety suffer, there is a still more important interest than that of piety—that of truth."

'Dislike of "Modernism" is mainly due to a belief that it will disintegrate the Christian faith. Early Christians disliked Greek philosophy because they feared that it would have precisely the same effect. But the philosophy was ultimately absorbed and used by the Church; and ideas derived from it are embedded in the so-called Nicene and Athanasian Creeds. There is, of course, no reason for thinking that Christianity and modern knowledge are essentially incompatible. A synthesis can, and will, be made; already the fear of science, common among Victorian Churchmen, is dying away.

'If Modernism were the product of mere latitudinarian indifference, it could be safely ignored. But it is a missionary movement, seeking to bring back to the Church thoughtful religious people now alienated; seeking so to transform the Church, to renew the vitality of its message, that such people may find in it their spiritual home. Because of the spread of education in England, the religious revival, that we need and pray for cannot be obscurantist. So, it seems to me, Modernism is preparing the way for a new manifestation among us of the undying power of the Spirit of Christ.'

We could only wish that what Dr. Barnes has written could have been said with as much force and simplicity in the recent utterances of Convocation, it would have done much to restore confidence in the English Church in the minds of our younger educated men and women.

Inflexible Intolerance.

The English Church Union is resolved to continue its attacks on English Modernism, and has made up its mind that it is impossible for it to tolerate the presence of Modernists within the Anglican Communion. The presidential address, delivered by the Earl of Shaftesbury, to the E.C.U. at its annual meeting in June, referred at length to the Girton Conference. The Earl dealt with the failure of the E.C.U. to secure the episcopal condemnation of Modernism, but warned his society that further efforts would be made in that behalf. The following declaration was received with applause:

'It is hardly possible that the Union should leave the matter where it stands; and it is very much to be hoped that some more definite pronouncement may be secured in order to allay the distress and apprehension created in the mind of the Church at large by the fact that such doctrine is allowed to be published by accredited teachers of the Church.'

The *Church Times* in its leader of June 16th seems also to hear 'ancestral voices prophesying war.' It proclaims what we fear we cannot but regard as a policy of uncompromising intolerance. After dealing with the present 'calm,' it proceeds:

'It does not follow that the friendliness which has begun to appear in high quarters will last. In some cases we believe it has been given

under a misunderstanding—the misunderstanding, namely, that we are willing to accept the position of being merely what Queen Victoria called one of the allowed parties in the Church. In this case toleration is extended to us on the supposition that we will extend the same toleration to Protestants and Modernists. Things may be different when it is found that Catholics have not lost their missionary zeal, that they believe that they alone are loyal members of the Church of England, and that they are not willing to lie down with Protestants and Modernists in the same bed. Even if this does not happen, it is quite certain that the Modernist peril is increasing. Modernists are becoming bolder and more eager to make our flesh creep. Lord Shaftesbury is evidently dissatisfied at the recent pronouncement by the Archbishop of Canterbury on the subject, saying that a situation might arise which would be intolerable both to the Modernists and to ourselves. We do not know what the Archbishop would consider intolerable, but if that point has not yet been reached, we doubt if it ever will be. As regards ourselves, the point at which things become intolerable was reached long ago, and this Lord Shaftesbury clearly recognizes.

We deplore this attitude. Modernists are quite willing to dwell with Anglo-Catholics and Evangelicals within the fold of the English Church, and to dwell with them on good terms. The intolerant and disruptive policy advocated by extreme Anglo-Catholics can do nothing but harm; it is the successor of Laud's policy of 'Thorough,' and only creates as an antidote the 'Root and Branch' policy of those whom it would extirpate. The fate of the intolerant is to be swept away by the opposition created by themselves. The English nation may endure with indifferent contempt what it regards as the Romanising policy of Anglo-Catholics; what it will not endure is intolerance. We would urge Anglo-Catholics for their own sake as much as for that of the English Church not to force an issue. Modernism has come to stay, and it has come to grow, and they will find it a kinder and more understanding neighbour than Protestantism. Why injure themselves and the Church by trying to extirpate it? Moreover, no loyal Anglo-Catholic ought to fear the ability of Traditionalism to hold its own against Modernism. Truth ever prevails and demands no assistance from intolerance. In the Preface of the Cambridge Conference Number of the *Modern Churchman* we pleaded for a calm and dispassionate judgment, whereas ever since in Romanist, and in extreme Anglo-Catholic, quarters there has been a succession of virulent attacks. Sir Henry Wotton, the ambassador of James I, coined the saying: *Disputandi pruritus, ecclesiarum scabies*, 'the itch of disputation is the scab of the Churches.' Will not our

opponents realize that nine-tenths of 'the distress and apprehension,' of which the Earl of Shaftesbury speaks, has been created by them and the Roman Catholics, who urge them on. Modern times require modern manners and modern methods; those of St. Jerome and Torquemada are out of date. Good-tempered discussion of doctrinal differences is altogether beneficial; scholarly research and profound thought are of even greater worth; but personal attacks and incitements to intolerance lower the Church in the eyes of the world, and are a misrepresentation of the spirit of Christ with which the Church is endowed for the benefit of mankind.

An Appeal for a New Policy.

A very significant paper was read by the Rev. A. E. J. Rawlinson at the Anglo-Catholic Congress at Birmingham on June 22, and has since been published as an Open Letter addressed to all members of the Church of England.[1]

Mr. Rawlinson is well known as one of the most brilliant contributors to *Foundations*, and although not a member of the E.C.U. has been for some years in close and sympathetic contact with the Anglo-Catholic party. His appeal therefore is that of an understanding friend. The new policy which Mr. Rawlinson urges the Anglo-Catholics to support is one of freedom. He admits that Catholicism is widely regarded as the precise antithesis of what is meant by freedom in religion. He writes:—

'A Catholic is supposed to be free neither in respect of belief nor in respect of practice; he is supposed to have submitted his reason to the dogmatic decisions of infallibility, and to be under obligation to conform his religious life in practical ways to the spiritual precepts of an ecclesiastical guide. If the claim to infallibility were true, and the ecclesiastical guide invariably wise, the state of affairs would be bad enough, inasmuch as the system would seem to involve the tutelage in perpetuity of human souls who ought rather, as free personalities, to have reached independence along with maturity of character and mind. It is doubly objectionable in view of the age-long conflict between authority and truth, and of the abuses which have made the power of the priest a byword, and sacerdotalist a term of odium and of reproach.'

He is convinced that Anglo-Catholicism is to-day, like Evangelicalism, at the parting of the ways. He describes the situation accurately as we have foreseen it for some years past, and asks what is the upshot to be.

[1] Longmans, Green & Co.

'Exactly as in the case of the Evangelical party, there is an old guard of conservative Die-hards and a young guard of progressives and liberals. If Evangelicalism as an organised movement and a distinctive school within the Church of England dies out in the comparatively near future, it will be because of the victory of the old guard of Die-Hards over the younger forces of liberalism within the Evangelical camp. What is going to be the outcome of the struggle which is visibly in progress in the ranks of Evangelicalism to-day? And what is going to be the outcome of the essentially similar struggle for the leadership of future policy, which is less obviously, but none the less actually, in progress below the surface within the ranks of the Anglo-Catholic party to-day?'

Whatever be the outcome, Mr. Rawlinson is quite sure that the Anglo-Catholic attitude of opposition to Modernism is wrong. He writes:—

'It is folly to take up an attitude of simple hostility to all forms of modernism, merely as such, and to attempt to fall back on tradition and authority alone; that is not what we need. What we need is a real presentation of historical Christianity in modern terms for modern men; a presentation which will set it in relation to the living thought of the times in which we live; a presentation which will be the work of men who are genuine free-thinkers, in the sense that they freely think, that they believe utterly in reason, in knowledge, and in truth, that they are prepared to take full account of critical scholarship and to be honest in mind; and at the same time a presentation which shall do adequate justice both to the eternal truth of the Gospel of Christ and to the spiritual experience of Christendom generally and of Catholic Christianity in particular.'

But the price of intellectual freedom is not a light one, and Mr. Rawlinson wishes to have this recognised and accepted.

'The price will be paid in the form of a crop of immediate heresies, partial errors, inadequate statements, false starts, unsuccessful experiments. You will inevitably have negative as well as positive movements in modern theology. Disturbing books will be written. The minds of the simple will be perplexed. The truth will prevail in the end, and prevail on its merits: and over all will be the over-ruling Spirit of God. But some men will for the time being make shipwreck as touching the faith: and others in despair and perplexity will go over to Rome: and the dream of a right little, tight little Anglican Church, with its clergy all orthodox and its laity all docile, will go to the winds.'

If the Churches were abolished.

The *St. Martin-in-the-Fields Review* for May contains an interesting contribution by Mr. Bernard Shaw, in which he answers the question:

'What effect do you think it would have on the country if every Church were shut and every parson unfrocked? Do you think a Religion is a necessity for the development of a nation? and, if so, must it not have some organization for its development? Or do you believe that nothing can be organized in the realm of the Spirit in this present existence?

His answer is as follows :—

'A very salutary effect indeed. It would soon provoke an irresistible demand for the Re-establishment of the Church, which could then start again without the superstitions that make it so impossible to-day. At present the Church has to make itself cheap in all sorts of ways to induce people to attend its services; and the cheaper it makes itself the less the people attend. Its articles are out of date; its services are out of date; and its ministers are men to whom such things do not matter because they are out of date themselves. The marriage service and the burial service are unbearable to people who take them seriously—and please do not conclude that I am thinking now of the current foolish and prudish objections to the sensible and true parts of the marriage service. Your main point is what would happen if the people suddenly found themselves without churches and rituals. So many of them would find that they had been deprived of a necessity of life that the want would have to be supplied; and there would presently be more churches than ever, and fuller ones. The only people who can do without churches are the simple materialists on the one hand, and on the other those who have no use for institutional worship because their churches are their own souls. That is the Quaker position; but you find such people in all circles. They are sometimes artists, sometimes philosophers; and the irony of circumstance has landed one of them in the extraordinary predicament of being a Dean.'

There are many indications beside this utterance of Mr. Shaw that the religious need is being recognised to-day. *Public Opinion* for May 26 contained a striking article entitled, 'I am religious because I am a man'—a phrase borrowed from Auguste Sabatier—and cited the famous passage from Tertullian :—

'Whenever the soul comes to itself, as out of a surfeit, or a sleep, or a sickness, and attains something of its natural soundness, it speaks of God.'

Miss Cicely Hamilton recently in the *Sunday Express* has very wisely indicated that this sense of religious need is not usually felt acutely by the young. She writes :—

'Let me add, before I end, that it seems to me unwise to make heavy demands on the religious emotion of youth. I believe that very few of us "get religion"—religion, that is to say, which is worth having—until life has proved it a necessity, a treasure that we cannot do without. I am not speaking of the saint (the exceptional man—born spiritual), but of the normal, ordinary human creature whose soul grows more slowly than his body; and who, while his world is young and absorbing, finds all that he needs and all that he hopes for in his own life, physical and mental.

'The above fact would appear to have escaped the notice of those who see a falling away from grace in the natural absorption of youth with itself and the world. Let such anxious guardians of the younger souls take comfort; we all grow older in the course of years, and—contrary to generally received opinion—we often grow better with age.'

Dr. Rufus Jones in *The Christian Century*, however, takes the view that if youth is not religious it is because our religious education is out of date. He writes :—

'Religion is a native, natural, normal, function of the human soul. Under proper nurture and guidance every child would leap to religion with spontaneity and joy, as he rises to the other great functions of his being when they come in process with the unfolding of his life.

'The apparent drop of religious interest on the part of the present rising generation is due to a number of cumulative causes and is almost certainly a temporary stage. Religion—like any instinctive tendency—is easily checked, inhibited or masked. If, when a fundamental tendency "ripens" it does not receive the proper stimulus, encouragement and backing, it is apt to "fade out" and disappear, or at least to become quiescent and dormant. This has happened to many young people in our time. The positive inculcation of religion has been absent in a very large number of homes. When the stage of wonder and awe was reached nothing was done to meet it, to foster it, to feed it, and to raise it to its true significance and glory.

'The Sunday School, and a good deal of the other religious nurture outside the home, have been crude, old-fashioned, dogmatic and superficial. These have not been, in many cases, of a type that interest, arrest and attract the growing boy or girl in our present-day complex world. They have been in large measure out of line with the facts of life which these same boys and girls were acquiring in their reading and in their conversation with their fellows. Then come the studies in science and history in school and college which strike straight across the group of ideas that have been accumulated in the field of religion. The rivalry is sharp and acute. The secular teaching is backed with solid authority, it is verified by example and experiment, and the other stock of ideas is challenged and found wanting.'

It has been recently proposed in our Diocesan Conferences that we should have an addition made to the Church Catechism. Possibly what we need is an entirely new one, which would begin by telling us not about our godfathers but about God, Who He is, and how we may hold communion with Him, and what is the use of the Bible and the Church.

The Ministry and Creed of the United Church.

The recent Report on Church Unity put forth by a Conference consisting of the two English Archbishops, a number of bishops, and the representatives of the Baptist, Congregationalist, Methodist, Moravian, and Presbyterian, bodies in this country is a significant document. It deals with the United Church, its Ministry, and Creeds.

The Conference agreed that the Church is one, and ought to be visibly one, and that it has possessed certain recognisable marks since the days of the Apostles, *viz.* :—

'(*a*) The profession of faith in God as revealed and incarnate in

Of some modern divines it may truly be said that, when they read the Fathers, a veil is upon their hearts.

There is another truth which might have been supposed to be—since the days (let us say) of Blanco White and Bishop Hampden—pretty generally admitted; and that is the fact that the established doctrine of the Church has been evolved very largely by a fusion of the original ideas of Christianity with the ideas and doctrines of Greek philosophy. Even this Bishop Gore is prepared to deny.

> 'What the Church then borrowed from Greek thought was her terminology, not the substance of her creed.'[3]

The naiveté of this statement is remarkable. To suppose that we can thus sharply separate between thought and terminology —that the thought of an individual or of a school can remain entirely unaffected by the adoption of a wholly new terminology —is a notion which one would hardly have expected from a theologian of Bishop Gore's wide reading. New words necessarily bring with them new meanings, suggestions, associations. Moreover, words—especially in the region of philosophical thought—are always changing their meaning, and the changes are either caused by or they cause a change in men's thoughts. It would be absurd to say that it was merely a new term or a new use of an old term which came into the world when Socrates or Plato began to teach the doctrine of 'ideas.' It is equally absurd to suppose that, when men who had previously not used the word 'substance,' or any possible Aramaic equivalent of it, began to discuss whether the Son was of one substance with the Father, or of like substance or of unlike substance, those who accepted the orthodox view were really only thinking the thoughts of St. Mark or St. Paul, or even those of the Fourth Evangelist. Obviously the men who discussed such questions were facing new problems. And consequently were thinking new thoughts, whatever was the answer they gave to them. One answer may have been more continuous, more harmonious, more consistent with the earlier tradition than another: but assuredly it was not the same thought.

[3] *Ib.*, p. 101. He afterwards makes a certain exception as to the use of the term Hypostasis, but apparently without seeing how much is implied in the exception.

And there is another assumption of Bishop Gore's which is strangely inconsistent with the conclusions of most modern scholars. He assumes that the meaning of these terms, which he admits to be borrowed from Greek philosophy, is something perfectly simple and unmistakable, and (apparently) always the same.

> 'The ideas of substance or thing, of personality, of nature, are permanent ideas; we cannot get rid of them; no better words could be suggested to express them.'[4]

To suppose that even these terms (and he carefully selects the less technical in the elaborate vocabulary of dogma)—whether we think of the English words or their Greek equivalents—have been always used with the same meaning, is a strange contention for anyone even a little acquainted with the history of human thought.

A good illustration of the effect which these assumptions exercise upon Bishop Gore's thought is supplied by the history of the words *Ousia* and *Hypostasis*. The terms in ordinary usage meant practically the same thing. Bishop Gore recognizes, of course, that in the Nicene anathemas, as in the writings of Athanasius, these words are used as equivalents, and they are used to express the unity of the Godhead: Father and Son were of the same *ousia* or *hypostasis*. In Athanasius' earlier days the doctrine of two hypostases or three was a characteristically, if not exclusively, Arian mode of expression. The Bishop is no doubt more familiar than I am with the process by which this change came about. He knows that at the Synod of Alexandria, presided over by Athanasius himself in his old age, it was settled that, while there was certainly only one *Ousia* in the Godhead, the use of the term *Hypostasis* to denote each of them might be tolerated, while the older use of the term as the equivalent of *Ousia* was still permitted. It is strange that Bishop Gore should suppose that such a change of terminology should be possible without a corresponding change of thought—whether the change of terminology be thought of as the cause or as the effect of an intellectual change. It is pretty obvious that, when men who had been taught to

[4] *Bampton Lectures*, p. 105. In a recent utterance (the *Deity of Christ*, p. 70) he admits that 'the theory, the theology of the Church,' we owe to the Greeks. Surely this is something more than 'terminology.'

think of the Son as of one *hypostasis* with the Father and to reject with indignation the notion of two or three hypostases, came to apply to Father and Son separately the very word which they had hitherto used to denote their unity, this must have implied a movement of thought towards an increased emphasis on the separateness and a diminished emphasis upon the unity. And this is exactly what critical students of dogmatic history tell us was the case.

One of the great puzzles of early Church history is to understand (1) the sudden abandonment of the Nicene formula by the greater part of the Christian world after the almost universal acceptance of it at the Council: (2) the eventual triumph of the Nicene formula. Professor Harnack and others have taught us to understand the meaning of the change. The Athanasian ideas went far beyond the commonly accepted ideas on the subject. Athanasius was at least as much an innovator as Arius, or more so. The usually accepted ideas in the pre-Nicene period (outside Sabellian circles) were, if not Arian, at least nearer to Arianism than they were to Athanasianism. Justin and others called the Son frankly a 'second' or 'another' God. A new development was urgently called for, if the Church was not to lapse into sheer Polytheism. The 'higher' the Arianism might be, the greater the measure or the kind of divinity ascribed to the Son, if He was not to be regarded as sharing the very same Godhead as the Father, the greater was the danger of His being thought of as one of a triad of three distinct Deities. The true glory of Athanasius is that he saved the Monotheism of the Church—or at least began the process by which Monotheism might be saved. But to say that Athanasius was right, or at least much nearer the truth than Arius, is not to explain how an Arian world eventually became Athanasian or Nicaean. When we note the change in the meaning of the term *Hypostasis*, we begin to see the inner history of the process. We may either look upon the change registered at Alexandria (362 A.D.) as a merely diplomatic or external compromise between two really distinct modes of thought, or as an intellectual compromise by which a *tertium quid* was discovered between the sharply antagonistic positions. It was probably both. There was a coming together of the moderate

men of both parties—a practical desire for outward unity and also a disposition towards intellectual conciliation. The excesses of the extreme or Anomoean Arians which began by saying that Christ was of unlike substance to the Father and ended by making Him 'a mere man' created a reaction against Arianism in general: and there was a corresponding disposition on the part of the Athanasians to put the best construction upon the language used by the Conservatives or moderate Arians. The compromise took this form. The term *Hypostasis* came to be understood as expressing the distinctions in the Godhead—at first side by side with the older phraseology but eventually to its practical exclusion; while the Arians gave up the three *Ousiai* and agreed that there was only one *Ousia* in the Godhead. On the other hand the Arians agreed to adopt the Nicaean formula, *Homo-ousion*, but they practically explained it in a sense approximating to the moderate Arian *Homoi-ousion*. Athanasius himself consented to explain 'of one *Hypostasis* with the Father,' by the words 'like in all things' to the Father. The group of theologians through whose influence this compromise was effected, was what is now known as the Cappadocian School, of which the chief members are Basil, Gregory of Nyssa, and Gregory Nazianzen.[5]

My object in calling attention to these facts is to bring out the great variety of thought which may be covered by a common acceptance of such phrases as the *Homo-ousion* or the three *Hypostases*. Bishop Gore (so far as I have been able to understand him) contends that no one can honestly accept the Creed of Nicaea without regarding Father and Son as two separate 'personalities' in the modern English sense of the

[5] This view, which is supported by Zahn and Gwatkin as well as Harnack, has been vigorously combated by Prof. Bethune-Baker in a learned article (*Texts and Studies*, ed. Robinson, Vol. vii, No. 1). But the passages quoted by him from the three Cappadocian Fathers seems to me to prove the opposite of what he intends. They seem to me to show clearly that these writers did, as Athanasius did not, habitually think of the Three on the analogy of three human individuals, though they undoubtedly try to balance the obvious Tritheism of the comparison by distinctions and strong assertions of the Unity. It will be observed that I have avoided the assertion that their position is actually identical with that of the Homoiousian Arians, but it seems to me quite clear that they follow them in asserting a much stronger separation between Father and Son than Athanasius had done.

word. At all events he uses the terms 'person' and 'personality' without a word to distinguish their theological meaning from that which they bear in common life or modern philosophy. Now I think I have shown that, judged by this test, Athanasius was not a Nicene. He does not use the word Personality or any Greek term which can fairly be regarded as its equivalent. If you insist that *Hypostasis*, which was eventually accepted as the theological equivalent of the Latin *Persona*, really means the same thing as the modern English 'Person,' then we must say that Athanasius explicitly denied that Father and Son were distinct Persons: for he held that there was only one *hypostasis* of Father and Son. Without saying that his language is either perfectly consistent or perfectly intelligible, his conception of the Unity of the Godhead is much stronger than what Bishop Gore regards as essential to orthodoxy: he makes the Father and the pre-incarnate Son far less distinct than does Bishop Gore. It is quite clear that Athanasius was no Tritheist. This is not nearly so clear with Bishop Gore.

Athanasius was no Tritheist, but when we turn to the Cappadocians, with their three *Hypostases*, there indeed we do encounter a mode of thinking and speaking about the Trinity very similar to the mode of speaking and thinking which is now commonly accepted as orthodox, but which Athanasius, at least in his earlier days, would have been disposed to treat as savouring of Homoi-ousean Arianism or of positive Tritheism. At the very least, these men emphasized the threeness rather than the oneness.

> 'Starting as they did, from the three-ness in the Divine, with the unity as a mysterious problem, it was particularly difficult for the Cappadocians to avoid the semblance of Tritheism, and this was an accusation long current in the West.'[6]

It is chiefly upon this compromise between Athanasianism and Arianism, if I am not mistaken, that the theology of Bishop Gore is built up. In many ways these men are worthy of the highest respect. Would that the popular orthodoxy of the day were as philosophical and as liberal as the teaching of the two Gregories! But their weakest point is their approximation to

[6] *The Person of Jesus Christ*, Prof. Mackintosh, ed. iii, p. 194.

Tritheism. And yet after all their assertion of the Divine Unity is much stronger than anything which I find in Bishop Gore.[7]

Whatever may be thought of the Cappadocian compromise in the West, just because its faith was simpler and less subtle, the attachment to Monotheism was much stronger. I have attempted to show that even for Athanasius the Second Person in the Godhead was not thought of as a distinct Person from the Father in anything like the ordinary modern sense in which Bishop Gore and his friends appear to take it. Still more decidedly is this the case when we turn to St. Augustine and the Schoolmen whose theology was built up upon his. In examining the teaching of St. Augustine on this subject, it must be remembered that his treatise on the Holy Trinity is the source of what has always been accounted in the West the orthodox doctrine on the subject. The so-called Athanasian Creed is simply a bald and bad epitome of that work—bad because everything which tends to explain the doctrine and make it intelligible is left out.

Now, in spite of Bishop's Gore's pontifical denials, I maintain that it is quite clear that for St. Augustine the Son was not thought of as a distinct person from the Father in anything approaching the modern sense. He repeats and enlarges the physical analogies which help us so little when we have to do with the phenomena of Mind—the fountain and the stream, the light and the brightness or the whiteness and so on. But the analogy upon which he most strongly insists is the relation between different aspects or activities of the human mind. Never does he compare the relations between the Persons of the

[7] Greg. Naz. *Orat.* xxxix, 12 (*cf.* Ottley, *Doctrine of the Incarnation* II, pp. 45-7). So Dorner says of Basil: 'If we ask . . . whether when he speaks of *hypostasis*, he means a person in the sense in which we use the term of men, we must answer, "No."' (*Doctrine of the Person of Christ*, E.T., Div. I, Vol. II, 1862, Third Epoch, ch. 3, p. 310.) It is true that Bishop Gore writes: 'The three Persons are not separable individuals, so that it could be argued that what one of the sacred three does another does not do, as we commonly argue about persons among ourselves, recognizing each person as separate and exclusive of others' (*Bampton Lectures*, p. 133). This statement no doubt satisfies the requirements of conventional orthodoxy, but it does not alter the impression that he habitually thinks of the three Persons as three quite distinct consciousnesses always co-operating with each other.

Trinity to the relations between two human beings or two members of any other species of conscious beings. The Trinity is always likened to the relation between different activities of one and the same divine Mind. That God is one Mind (*una mens*) is with him a fundamental truth. The human activities within the one consciousness in the light in which he understands the Trinity are not always the same. The Father is sometimes *Principium* (the 'source of Godhead,' *pege theotetos*, though this term is also applicable to the Son in virtue of the double procession); sometimes He is Memory, sometimes Mind (*Mens*) in general. The Son is the Wisdom of the Father or His knowledge (*sapientia*) or His intelligence (*intelligentia*), the knowledge by which He knows Himself; and sometimes (be it added) created beings are in some sense included in the being of the Word.[8] The Holy Spirit is the Love by which the Father is loved by the Son and the Son by the Father. In other passages He is the Will (*voluntas*) of God. Since the Will of God is always a loving Will, there is no essential discrepancy between the two formulae. How little he thinks of the three Persons as three distinct minds is most conspicuously shown by his doctrine that the love of the Father for the Son is the Holy Spirit.[9] The love of one entity for another cannot possibly be thought of as a person in the modern sense, and then (be it remembered) that the Son whom the Father loves and knows is for St. Augustine simply God Himself. The Son is not only God's subjective thinking, but also the object of His thought, just as when a human subject knows himself, the object of his knowledge is a sense distinguished from the knowing self, and is yet at the same time that very self.

That there are passages inconsistent with this interpretation to be found in St. Augustine I do not deny. Much more even than St. Athanasius, he was bound by authorities which he could not disregard, authorities in which the Son was, or seemed to be treated as, a distinct Mind. He was full of the idea that the Trinity was, strictly speaking, incomprehensible to mortal

[8] 'In nomine Verbi significatur non solum respectus ad Patrem, sed etiam ad illa quae per Verbum facti sunt operativa potentia.'—*Quaest*, L. lxxxiii, Q. 63.

[9] 'Spiritus quoque sanctus sive sit summa charitas utrumque conjungens nosque subjungens.'—*De Trin* VII, c. 3, 6.

minds. He is full of inconsistencies and full of intelligibilities.[10] He did not profess to make the doctrine completely intelligible. But he does *try* to make it reasonable; and, so far as he does so, he always thinks of God as a Being whose distinct activities as much constitute One Mind or Consciousness as Memory, Wisdom, and Love in a human being—not as three beings who are united by the closeness of their intercourse and their agreement to adopt the same policy in their government of the world after the fashion of the Arian Milton or our modern orthodox Tritheists. Man is the *imago Trinitatis*—one Mind, not three minds.[11] The '*Una Mens*' in God, the union of the three activities, is even closer than in the human mind: for in the human mind these distinguishable activities, though not three conscious beings, are, indeed, according to him, three *things*: in the Divine Mind they are only one thing which is called by all three names.[12]

In the Schoolmen the inconsistencies, the uncertainties, the mysticism of St. Augustine largely disappear. St. Augustine is reduced to a clear-cut doctrine, and here the fact that *Persona* is used in the most technical of senses positively leaps to the eyes. The first thinker who attempted to put what was, after all, only St. Augustine's doctrine into a quite definite and rational form was Abelard, the true founder of the scholastic theology: for him God is Power, Wisdom, and Love or Will. The clearness and lucidity with which the doctrine was expressed by Abelard exposed the unfortunate man to a furious persecution at the hands of ignorant ecclesiastics hounded on

[10] See especially *De Trin XV*, c. 7, 12, where he says: *Quis audeat dicere, Patrem nec se ipsum, nec Filium, nec Spiritum sanctum intelligere nisi per Filium, vel diligere nisi per Spiritum sanctum,* thus admitting two knowledges within the Trinity, which is inconsistent with his whole position. Athanasius had said the very thing of which Augustine exclaims, *Quis audeat dicere?*

[11] The Bishop always seems to avoid the admission of 'One Mind.' He says, indeed, that 'In God then, we imagine, is a perfect and eternal life, of will and reason and love': but from the context it would appear that the 'life' is thought of in the singular merely as we speak of many human beings sharing the same 'social life.'

[12] 'Nec distent in eis ista, sicut in nobis aliud est memoria, aliud est intelligentia, aliud dilectio sive charitas: sed unum aliquid sit quod omnia valeat, sicut ipsa sapientia' (XV., c. 17, 28). Of course there are distinctions which save him from actual Sabellianism.

by the arch-persecutor, St. Bernard. By one Council he was condemned for Sabellianism: by another for Arianism. But for all that the Trinitarian doctrine which he formulated was substantially the same as that which, in the hands of his successors, became the orthodox doctrine of the Western Churches. The *Sentences* of Abelard's disciple, Peter the Lombard, became the official text-book of theology taught in all the mediaeval Universities. For the Master of the *Sentences*, as for Abelard, the Father is Power, the Son Wisdom, the Holy Ghost Love or Will. In St. Thomas Aquinas the Triad is the same, except that he substitutes Augustine's term *Principium* for *Potentia*, but explains that Word as 'the power of generating the Son.' For Aquinas, as for St. Augustine, the Son is the knowledge by which God knows Himself, and the Holy Spirit is the love by which God loves Himself.

Bishop Gore has controverted my representation of the doctrine of St. Thomas in this matter; and I think he is bound to give some justification of this charge of misrepresentation, or to withdraw it publicly. The best way in which I can convince my readers that I am not misrepresenting St. Thomas, and that there is no trace in him of the three-mind view of the Godhead, will be to translate literally a few passages from the famous *Summa*.

First of all as to the meaning of the term Person and the relations between the Persons. St. Thomas thus explains the 'processions' of the Divine Persons, *i.e.* the *generatio* of the Son (which is also a *processio*), and the *processio* of the Holy Spirit.

> (1) 'We must not understand "procession" in the sense in which the term is used in corporal things or in connexion with motion in space, or with the action of any cause to produce an exterior effect, as warmth proceeds from the thing that heats into the thing heated: but in the sense of an intelligible emanation, as, for instance, the intelligible word (or concept) proceeds from a speaker while remaining at the same time in him' (*Summa Theol.*, P. *I.*, Q. xxvii, Art. 1).[13]

The relation of Father to Son is the relation of a thinker or a speaker to his thought. Has that the least resemblance

[13] Compare the words in the same article: 'Whoever understands, from the very fact that he understands, there proceeds something within him which is the conception of the thing understood coming forth from intellectual force and proceeding from his knowledge.'

to the relation between two human beings? Is the speaker or thinker one consciousness, and the spoken word or concept another thinker, another consciousness? That is what Bishop Gore is bound to show if he disputes my representation of Thomas Aquinas.

(2) 'By which name (*i.e.* Holy Spirit) is designated a certain vital motion and impulsion; as a man is said to be moved or impelled by love to do something' (*Ib.*, Q. xxvii, Art. 4).

How can the love which impels a man to do anything be thought of as a separate consciousness from the man?

(3) 'The processions in the divine region (*in divinis*) follow immanent actions which in an intelligible and divine nature are only two, to understand and to will, which are precisely the processions, in the divine region, of the Word and of Love' (*Ib.*, Q. xxvii, Art. 5).

What can be plainer? The Word is a name for God's thinking, including the object of His thought, which is also Himself, and includes in a sense potentially or actually all that He creates.

(4) Again: 'The term Word is applied in a special sense (*proprie*) to God, in a sense according to which the Word signifies the conception of the Intellect' (*Ib.*, Q. xxxiv, Art. 1).

(5) 'It must be said that in the Word there is implied a respect to the creature. The word therefore conceived in the mind is representative of anything that is actually understood. Whence in us there are divers words, according as the things understood are divers. But because God understands both Himself and all things in one act, His one and only (*unicum*) Word is expressive not only of the Father, but also of the creatures' (*Ib.*, Q. xxxiv, Art. 3).

Here the Word means the world, as it is thought of by God, and is therefore not a person in the modern sense.[14]

(6) 'The Son proceeds by way of intellect, as the Word: but the Holy Spirit by way of Will, as Love. But it is necessary that Love should proceed from the Word; for we do not love anything except what we conceive in our minds' (*Ib.*, Q. xxxvi, Art. 2).

Whatever may be thought of this as a defence of the Western doctrine of double procession, it shows clearly enough that the Son (apart from the Incarnation) is to St. Thomas just

[14] It will be observed that this object of the divine thought is only 'representative of' the creatures. A more thorough-going Idealism would have said that the created things themselves were the objects of the divine thought.

the divine thought, including the object which it thinks, while the Holy Spirit is the love which God has for the object of His thought (which is potentially all creation), and which love is inseparable from the thinking of that object.

> (7) 'When therefore it is said that the Holy Spirit is the love of the Father for (*in*) the Son, there is not signified anything that passes over (*transiens*) into another, but only a habitude towards the thing loved; as also in the Word there is implied a habitude of the Word towards the thing expressed by the Word' (*Ib.*, Q. xxxvii, Art. 1).

This is rather a difficult passage. It seems to mean that the Word represents in a sense, or contains, without being actually identified with, all the things which God was from all eternity going to create and does at a definite moment create and continuously conserve in time. In the same way God is the Holy Spirit because He eternally loves this thought of Himself and His creation. Its object is to guard against the suggestion that the Love, which is the Holy Spirit, begins to exist when the Holy Spirit puts forth the actual energy of love at a particular moment of time. Observe the phrase, 'the *thing* expressed by the Word.' The love with which the Spirit is identified is not of a kind which necessarily implies a conscious being as its object, or a capacity for returning the love. And yet the Holy Spirit is represented as being the love not merely of the Father for the Son but of the Son for the Father.[15] This is a difficult thought to grasp, and I do not know that Thomas ever clearly explains it, or reconciles it with the doctrine that the Son is just the Father's activity of thinking. It might perhaps be explained to mean that the Word (in a sense) includes all rational beings who have the capacity of returning the love of God, and in that sense the Word loves God the Father who is One Being with Himself. Or perhaps we should be nearer St. Thomas' thought if we suppose him to mean that since in thinking the divine Thought the Word necessarily loves that which He thinks, the Word may be said to be loving the Father from whom these thoughts proceed. At all events, be it observed, the Holy Spirit is not a lover but love: so the term Person does not by

[15] *Cf.* Q. xxxvii, Art. 2 (quoted above). The whole of this *Quæstio* is extremely subtle. Thomas has great difficulty in distinguishing his position from the position illogically and inconsistently condemned by St. Augustine in the passage quoted above (note 10).

itself imply a distinct consciousness that thinks and loves another distinct consciousness.

Finally, St. Thomas' position is summed up in the words :

> 'In rational creatures, therefore, in which there is intellect and will, there is found a representation of the Trinity by way of image in so far as there is found in them a word conceived (a concept) and a love that proceeds' (*Ib.*, Q. xlv, Art. 7).

Any candid and honest reader of these passages, even if he cannot share the added confidence which comes from the impression produced by reading them continuously and in their context, will, I think, require something more than Bishop Gore's *ipse dixit* to convince him that, when writers like St. Augustine, and still more clearly St. Thomas, speak of a Person of the Holy Trinity, they do not mean what we mean or anything like it. They do not consider the Father and the Son as personally distinct (in our sense) from each other or from the Holy Spirit: nor do they think of the pre-existing Son (after the fashion of Bishop Gore and the Arian Milton), as beings so distinct as to be capable of holding deliberations and conversations with one another. When they declare that God is One Mind (*Una Mens*), they really mean what they say.

Bishop Gore in his criticisms of myself has refused to accept my statements as to what I believe. He has claimed to look down into my thoughts and pronounce that, when I say that Christ is God and man, I really think of Him as man only. Such an attitude seems to me an unwarrantable presumption. I will not therefore be guilty of the same presumption towards him, and will refrain from saying that I suspect that, if I could look into his mind as he believes himself able to look into mine, I should find that he practically envisages the Holy Trinity to himself as three minds, *i.e.* three Gods, not less distinct, but only more unanimous and harmonious in their thoughts and plans, than any three pagan deities. I will not say this; I will content myself with observing that, though he escapes formal Tritheism by using the correct theological phrases[16] his thought is difficult to distinguish from Tritheism. He tells us that God,

[16] Though he always seems to avoid the '*una mens*' of Augustine and Aquinas.

though He is three Persons, is not three separate individuals. He has omitted to explain what difference he recognizes between a 'person' and an 'individual,'[17] when the term 'individual' is applied to a rational being. I think most modern philosophers or psychologists and most men in the street would say that by 'person' they mean precisely a being who possesses that kind of individuality which is possessed by a man and which distinguishes him from other men or other conscious beings. The term 'individual' is the wider term, since it may be applied to inanimate things or to spirits of lower than human rank. Not every individual is a person: but every person is an individual. What sort of entity is meant by a person who is not individual, I do not understand.

If Bishop Gore possesses sufficient knowledge of the accepted technicalities, and cultivates so much judicious reticence in explaining them, as to escape an actual avowal of Tritheism, that is not the case with other modern Anglican Theologians of less patristic learning, who deliberately apply to the separate 'Persons' of the Holy Trinity just that concept of Individuality which Bishop Gore reserves for the Undivided Trinity. Canon Peter Green calls the divine Persons

> 'Distinct entities of Will, Knowledge, and Desire, functioning in and through one common nature.'[18]

And he goes on to explain that by the three Persons possessing one nature he means that they are particulars in which (in a logical sense) the universal 'Divinity' resides, just as the universal 'Humanity' resides in three individual human persons.[19] It is difficult to see how an avowed Tritheist could explain himself more clearly. Another learned, but less philosophical

[17] See the whole passage quoted above (note 7), and my comments. It is not clear whether the Bishop means to deny that they are individuals or only that they are *separable* individuals in the sense which he goes on to define.

[18] *The Problem of Evil,* p. 133.

[19] This explanation is expressly repudiated by Basil, with Dorner's approval: 'Basil appears further to have been guided by the just feeling that deity, divine essence, ought not to be taken as the higher and the generic conception, under which the three are subsumed; for if deity be the generic idea, it will scarcely be possible to avoid Tritheism' (*Doctrine of the Person of Christ,* Div. I, Vol. II, Third Epoch.).

Canon, told the Church Congress at Southend that the Unity between the Father and the Son is *simply*

> 'a moral unity between minds which might imaginably differ—a unity which arises from unselfishness, mutual consideration, recognition of authority on the one hand, and sympathy and consideration in the exercise of it on the other—in fact, all those qualities which go to ensure harmony and co-operation in a family or a society.'

Just the language of Arius and Milton, the vein of thought so vehemently attacked by Athanasius. God, it seems, is simply a collective term for a happy family, an Olympian Pantheon without its family jars! If so, why not say at once 'three Gods'?

When we turn from the writings of the modern pseudo-orthodox to St. Thomas Aquinas, we find, as I have tried to show, a doctrine of the Trinity which is perfectly rational, intelligible, and at bottom quite simple. That God is Power, Wisdom and Love is surely a doctrine which most genuine Theists will accept. It is a doctrine which might well be taught in every Sunday School. To some it will seem an insuperable objection that most Unitarians would accept it. That ought to be no objection to a reasonable Trinitarian. If the doctrine of the Holy Trinity has been so misrepresented as to become a source of offence to so many, it ought not surely to be an objection to a modern restatement of it that it would enable many Unitarians to accept it, and so to be Unitarians no longer. The doctrine is no worse because it happens to be perfectly orthodox. You cannot be more orthodox than St. Thomas Aquinas, even if in agreeing with him you have the misfortune to disagree with Canon Mason, Canon Peter Green, and even Bishop Gore.

While I contend that the actual doctrine of the Trinity as taught by Thomas Aquinas is both simple and rational, I think candour requires that I should admit that there are many doctrinal statements in St. Thomas which it is much more difficult for a modern philosophical thinker to translate into terms of intelligible modern thought. But these are positions which the most conservative modern Anglican, unless he is among the very few who have thought themselves into a thoroughly scholastic frame of mind, will find it as difficult as the modernist to accept or to interpret. I will take an instance. When St.

Thomas calls the three Persons *Hypostases* he does not imply that they are separate conscious beings: the word *Hypostasis* has no suggestion in it of any of the ideas commonly implied by our modern term 'person'—consciousness, thought, will. But it does suggest the idea of Substance. And he is very anxious to establish the fact that the divine Power, Wisdom, and Love are distinct *hypostases* or substances. This was forced upon him by the weight of the authorities which had asserted the doctrine, and by the necessity of escaping the appearance of Sabellianism. And yet it is the essence of his doctrine that the three Persons are three relations—three internal relations within the divine Mind. A *hypostasis* seems to mean for him precisely a thing of which something can be predicated, but which cannot be predicated of anything else. If then the Son means the relation of 'Sonship' (*filiatio*) it would seem that it must be a predicate of some other thing: you cannot have a relation without terms. To escape this difficulty, he has to fall back upon the doctrine that in the divine nature relations are not mere relations but are real things: in the divine nature there is no difference between the abstract and the concrete. I will not attempt the translation of this doctrine into terms of modern philosophy. I am far from saying that it cannot be done. Indeed, it bears a strong resemblance to that doctrine that all relation is at bottom unreal which, in Mr. Bradley's hands, leads up to a conception of the Absolute fundamentally opposed to that which Thomas or any other genuinely Theistic thinker wishes to defend. From a more philosophical point of view there can be no difficulty in calling the divine Wisdom a *hypostasis*. It is something real and something distinguishable from the divine Power. It is no less a reality because it is incapable of existing apart from that Power.

I am afraid that some of my readers may already be wearied even with the amount of metaphysical subtlety which is involved in the scholastic doctrine of the Trinity, even so far as I have expounded it. They may ask whether it is really worth while to construct an apology for formulae which seem so remote from modern modes of thinking and speaking, and which have so little to do with life and godliness. Had we not better get rid of them altogether? I am far from attaching high

intrinsic value to the formulae about the Trinity and the Incarnation which are contained in the decrees of the General Councils and in the Patristic and Scholastic Theologies which have grown out of them. I believe that for practical purposes, in our teaching and our preaching, it is a very simple doctrine about the Person of Christ that we want—a doctrine which shall recognize the reality and the supremacy of the revelation which God has made of Himself in Christ, which shall understand the Divinity of Christ in such a way as not to make his humanity unreal or unintelligible, but which shall not attempt to define the nature and mode of the union of the divine and human in Christ in any but the simplest way. But the fact remains that we have got these formulae. Some of them are contained in the Creeds and Confessions of Faith, in hymns and in prayers. They are often understood in a way which makes them unintelligible, irrational, and a serious obstacle to vital faith in Christ and to hearty membership in the Churches which are more or less committed to the traditional phrases. And those who understand the Christian doctrine in a manner more intelligible and more natural to modern minds, are accused of unorthodoxy; and (if they are clergymen) are told that, as honest men, they have no place in the Churches which profess to be orthodox or Catholic. These accusations have a most deterrent effect on possible candidates for Holy Orders. Hence, where it is possible to show that the original meaning of these formulae, or the meaning which they have received at the hands of authorities in the past whose orthodoxy cannot be disputed, is really much more reasonable and intelligible than is commonly supposed, and to show that their essential meaning is capable of being expressed in simpler and more modern language, one is doing a useful thing. I have tried to show that this is so to some extent with the Trinitarian dogma as expounded by Athanasius, still more as expounded by St. Augustine, and most of all with the interpretation which that doctrine receives in the most authoritative of the Schoolmen. In particular I have tried to show that the greatest cause of offence in the Trinitarian doctrine is no part of the orthodox dogma. What makes the doctrine seem unreasonable and unintelligible to most thoughtful modern minds is the notion that to speak of three persons in the Godhead

involves the belief that God is three distinct consciousnesses, whose unity consists merely in the closeness of their co-operation and mutual agreement. This is the feature in the Trinitarian doctrine which causes most difficulty, and yet which is most insisted on by the recognized champions of orthodoxy. I believe that this interpretation is not required even by the most rigid orthodoxy, and that, on the contrary, the zealots who insist upon it are themselves unorthodox, and go very near to the confines of Tritheism if they do not deliberately and ostentatiously plunge into it. (Tritheism in these days seems not to be unpopular: nobody objects to believing too much.) I have no wish to call such men heretics for the purpose of creating odium against them—still less with any suggestion that they should be turned out of the Church of England or any other orthodox Church to whose ministry they may chance to belong. But to point out these heresies of the orthodox is a good way of showing that they are not justified in accusing those who understand the doctrine more rationally of not believing in the doctrine—even in the strictest and most orthodox doctrine—of the Holy Trinity and the Divinity, or (if they prefer it) the 'Deity' of Christ.

I do not believe that the patristic and scholastic formulations of these doctrines are of very much spiritual value. Unless they are explained and translated into more modern terms, they may even be causes of much spiritual loss—alike to those who make much of them and to those whom their existence prevents from reaching the very truth which they were originally designed to assert. It is, as it seems to me, of the utmost importance that these elaborate technicalities should be looked upon merely as means of expressing in terms of an obsolete terminology and an obsolete philosophy the infinitely important truth that God has made a full, supreme, and, in a sense, final revelation of Himself in the historical personality of the man Christ Jesus; and yet that He still goes on revealing Himself in the hearts and consciences of men, and particularly in that Society of Christ's followers which we call the Church. I do not think these technicalities are very important, even when explained; but unexplained, they are positively pernicious.

BOOK NOTICES

A GREAT BOOK ON THE NEW TESTAMENT*

These Hibbert Lectures were intended to 'lay before the educated public an outline of the present position of the New Testament in the light of modern criticism.' There must be no small number of people within and without the pale of organised Christianity who are really anxious to know what to think about the New Testament. They hear of attacks upon the Bible. Higher critics are still the bogies of many pulpits. Verbal inspiration cannot foster intelligent Bible reading among the thoughtful, though it is still useful at certain conferences to flog party animosities into a trot. For these and many cognate reasons intelligent and spiritually sensitive people are genuinely troubled to-day. They do not understand that many of the historic attacks upon the Bible have been completely crushed by patient scientific criticism. The churches have yet to take the key of knowledge gained by a hundred years of scholarship and open the doors of the scriptures that man may now as before possess that comfort which no other book can give. When the chained Bibles were placed in the parish churches of this country in the days of the great Re-formation of religion, the public interest was as enormous as the effect was far-reaching. What then might be the effects of a Bible set before the people to-day, not chained to a magical and superstitious theory of inspiration, but free to make its own appeal? That is the precise difficulty which criticism strives to overcome. So Professor Moffatt rightly says that 'we are learning to approach this great literature from the proper angle, and thus to see it in its true perspective. This approach to the New Testament is the work of the historical method.' It is significant that a critic of the massive reputation of Dr. Moffatt should aim primarily at the needs of an audience wider than that of Biblical experts. These lectures will achieve much if they only reassure those who think any departure from the 'old ways' must result in the rejection of the authority of the New Testament. This light assumption will not so readily be made in the face of Dr. Moffatt's work except perhaps by those who imagine that they have merely to say something frequently and emphatically enough to silence the advocates of a distasteful theory. Dr. Moffatt knows the constituent parts of the British public very well. He has a word too for that mental inertia which flourishes in the suburbs of large cities. His irony plays round this feature of our day thus: 'some people grudge the study of a New Testament passage the amount of attention they would bestow upon the lie of a golf ball.' He reminds the sport and mammon distracted middle classes that the New Testament 'contains a spiritual and social message which this preoccupied country had better try to master before it approaches anything else.'

The most useful part of a review is the impression of a book which may be conveyed to readers of the review. Space will not allow more than an enumeration of the chapter headings and the briefest of remarks about some of the more important features.

'First Impressions of the New Testament' is the heading of the first chapter. After remarking that it 'is the smallest religious book of any great religion,' and that it is 'better arranged' than the Koran, for instance, Dr. Moffatt warns the reader of the New Testament that his troubles commence at this point. The order of the books as we find them

* *The Approach to the New Testament.* Lectures delivered in London and Cambridge, April—May, 1921, by JAMES MOFFATT, D.D., D.Litt. (Hodder and Stoughton. Price 8/6 net.)

is not 'the order in which the books were written'. . . . the Book of Revelation, for example, was not written last, . . . the gospels were not composed till a number of the epistles were in circulation.' The New Testament in *Everyman Series* will be found useful by those who desire to experience the sensation which follows the reading of the New Testament in its probable chronological order.

The next noteworthy feature is that it is eminently a 'healthy book, healthy in its emphasis on truth . . . vital energy, and on the realities of life . . . there are no scented phrases or pretty fancies in its pages . . . it was not written for religious dilettantes, nor by such persons.' Another note of the New Testament is its Vitality. It is the book of a Semitic religion which was severed from its native soil and struck its roots into that of an alien civilisation. Its pages reveal the spirit of the first pioneers to whom every foreign land was a fatherland, and every fatherland a foreign land. 'Look into the New Testament and you see Christianity changing under your eyes . . . because it is alive.' The New Testament includes cowards in one of its lists of the damned. Fear is the enemy which Love casts out. Touching this Dr. Moffatt has a striking sentence which runs thus: 'a nervous plea for the stationary at all costs and in all departments of the Church to-day has no right to cut wood for its crutches from the forest of Church history, least of all from the historical study of the New Testament.' But jaunty ecclesiastical bolsheviks are not therefore to run away with the idea that life and liberty mean freedom from tradition as well as traditionalism.

'The origin and meaning of the name' New Testament are dealt with in the second chapter. Dr. Moffatt reiterates a point previously elucidated in his Introduction to the New Testament as follows: 'The Christian movement produced the Christian churches, and through them the Christian scriptures; then came the further idea of collecting those scriptures into an inspired and authoritative canon.'

The third chapter is devoted to one of the main problems of the New Testament, *i.e.* its relationship to the Old Testament which preceded it. This is a matter of more than academic importance to-day when there are signs in some quarters of an attempt to depreciate the Old Testament. It might be well to remember that the only scriptures which St. Paul had and used were the books of the Old Testament. There is much in this chapter which will amply repay the study of it. The first part deals with 'the inspiration of the Old Testament,' and shows how this was gradually extended to the New Testament. The second part covers the increasingly debated subject of the problem raised by the Old Testament quotations found in the New Testament. The ancient and modern views of the validity and effectiveness of Messianic predictions are adequately presented. A most interesting discussion is then entered upon as to the possibility of 'any of the Old Testament stories or conceptions' having led 'to the formulation of narratives in the early Church.'

Just as the New Testament cannot be isolated from the Old Testament without loss of perspective so it is equally necessary to regard the New Testament 'in the light of its relation to the Christian Church.' This is the ground covered in the fourth chapter, and is the link with the second part of these lectures which demonstrate what the Historical Method can do and how it does it. Justice is done to Marcion at the beginning of the era of the formation of the Canon. Marcion attempted to approach the New Testament properly in presenting 'the New Testament in re-edited form as a distinctly Christian collection of books in order to bring out the distinctively Christian message.' Then when 'at the Reformation Greece rose from the dead with the New Testament in her

hand,' Erasmus, 'that great injur'd name,' as Pope says, 'rolled away the stone and made this resurrection possible.' There is a quotation on p. 113 which should prove useful to the Bible Society. Erasmus is writing of the power of the scriptures when they are made intelligible. Historical criticism really came into its own with Baur, after it had been slowly gathering strength since the 16th century. Marcion, Erasmus, Baur! Perhaps they were content to 'have died not having received 'the fruits of their search for truth. Time constantly upsets the estimates of men, especially in proving the legitimacy of the children of wisdom.

The fifth chapter contains two examples of the historical method at work of which that selected from Gal. iv 21—v 1 appears to be the more convincing and suggestive.

The task of the historical method is indicated in the next chapter. It is not 'to provide evidence for foregone dogmatic conclusions. . . . Historical investigation is rehabilitating more of tradition . . . than used to be thought likely; but this is its effect, not its aim. . . . Dogma has no right to take advantage of the modesty which is characteristic of true historical research.' The historical method keeps at arms' length the mystical depreciation of history which may occasionally be valid 'and valuable against the rationalist idea,' and warns 'the impatient mystic against trying a short-cut to religious reality which is really a cul-de-sac.' Again there is a tendency 'to detach and practice the great ethical principles of the New Testament apart from the history and theology . . . it does matter who spake words like "Love one another." . . . Christian love may be defined as devotion to the ends of God in human personality . . . to regard it as a mere intuition will in the long run be equivalent to making it a cut flower, not a living plant.'

In the seventh chapter Dr. Moffatt handles some of the objections which from time to time have been raised against the historical method. He selects five of them. It would be interesting to read an adequate refutation of the methods by which such objections, mostly found to be superficial, are met and dispersed. Dr. Moffatt speaks the truth in love to the misguided obscurantist and critic alike. The sincere student has no need to apologise for his existence. He is doing nothing disgraceful as long as he is searching for truth.

The last chapter is concerned with the 'limitations of the historical method.' Problems of the supernatural and of the ethical application of the New Testament fall outside the range of the historical method. Particularly is this true of the Devotional Use of the New Testament. When the critic has done his work faithfully there are those undefined regions of life which are illuminated by a Light which never was on land or sea. When the Angelus is ringing, as it does ring out of the pages of the New Testament, there broods the peace of God. That which the world cannot give, is distilled from 'the little book opened.' A. T. Woodman Dowding.

A FALSE ANTITHESIS.*

The Warden of Wadham, in a non-committal foreword to Dr. Harris' book, points out that the author claims to postpone the question, Can Modernist views be reconciled with the Faith? until an answer has been given to the preliminary question, Can they be justified by the principles of philosophic and historic criticism on which they profess to be based? This is certainly the rational order of procedure, and precludes all appeals to the authority of the ecclesiastic or the popular preacher.

The question, then, is one of philosophy and history; upon this open ground Dr. Harris claims to take his stand. To examine his argument

* *Creeds or No Creeds.* By Charles Harris, D.D. (Murray. 15/-.)

in detail would involve the expenditure of far more space than we have at our disposal, and we must confine ourselves to a few relevant considerations.

We learn that the Modernist position, from a philosophical point of view is based on the Kantian theory of the relativity of all human knowlege, which has

> 'deflected from its path and given a new orientation to the main stream of European philosophy, and if ever that philosophy is to recover its original orientation, as the present reaction against Kant suggests that it may, it can only be by returning to the pre-Kantian view that the human mind is capable of true objective knowledge.' (p. 34.)

It is indeed not impossible that here Dr. Harris has laid his finger on one *fons et origo malorum*; for, according to the view of many, one good service which was rendered by Kant to his fellow-creatures was that he gave the *coup de grâce* to dogmatism in all its shapes, whether philosophical or theological. He dethroned that particular idol of the cave, dear to secularists and ultramontanes alike. Yet to declare that this relativism 'postulates an irrational universe'(p. 64), strikes us as a fantastic criticism of Kant's position. Kant, as we understand that philosopher, merely pointed out that the human mind is not so constituted that it can usefully occupy itself in dogmatising about what lies outside the range of empirical knowledge. And thus understood, Kantianism is so far from being repugnant to 'common-sense' in its rationality' (p. 64), that it forms the basis of the 'common sense' attitude towards what are called 'ultimate problems.'

In fact, we venture to go further; this view of the inadequacy of human knowledge constituted the fundamental principle of the *Doctor Angelicus,* of Catholic Orthodoxy, who was the first to draw an invidious distinction between Reason and Revelation. Where Kant differed from Aquinas was not in his view of the inadequacy of the human intellect but in his attitude to those problems which seem to lie outside the range of the human mind. Kant and Aquinas differed fundamentally, for while Aquinas took refuge in the historical figment of a revealed theology, Kant was satisfied with suggesting that where the human intellect failed there might be other human faculties, and other sides of human experience, competent to shed some light on the problem, and he wrote his *Critique of Practical Reason* to show this. He suggested that not only the intellect, but the ethical sense, and the religious instinct, and even the aesthetic faculty, have contributions to make towards a philosophy of existence. Of course for those who would be satisfied with nothing less than absolute certainty in regions where such a thing is not to be had, Kant had very little satisfaction to offer. For such minds the alternatives are dogmatism or scepticism; in fact, 'creeds or no creeds.' But all the time the distinction is a vicious one; it is a case of the fallacy of 'either, or'—a fallacy we may frequently detect in the writings of apologists for a type of conservative theology of which this is the *dernier ressort.*

Dr. Harris tells us that 'modern Oxford under the influence of Professor Cook Wilson and Mr. Thomas Case, has become predominantly anti-Kantian and anti-idealistic' (p. 34). This repudiation of its traditional philosophical attitude by the university of T. H. Green, is, if it be not imaginary, a fact of great interest; but it would be equally interesting to learn how far the new anti-idealism shares Dr. Harris' standpoint in theology. Outside Oxford the reaction against Idealism, in the hands of such original and vigorous thinkers as Mr. Bertrand Russell, at Cambridge, and Professor Alexander, at Manchester, seems to display few signs of becoming associated with a new orthodox apologetic. It is highly diffi-

cult to imagine either of these philosophers devoting much attention to *Creeds or No Creeds,* save perhaps as interesting evidence that there exist even yet quiet backwaters of thought where frail canoes may be paddled by clerical pic-nickers. One cannot have it both ways: if Kant was fundamentally wrong, modern idealism, which traces its ancestry to him, and which (as criticised by Hegel) does seem to supply a basis for a rational system of Christian theology, is, we must conclude, discredited. It is true that neither Kant nor Hegel had any use for a certain type of dogmatism; but out of love for that dogmatism are we to embrace the modern anti-idealists? We shall not find much rest on their bosoms.

It is possible that the philosopher who knows little of history may imagine that the merits of Dr. Harris' book must lie in the sections devoted to historical criticism, but before turning to these, a few remarks seem to be called for upon a historical-philosophical question often discussed by orthodox apologists with a singular absence of clear thinking; we refer to the vexed question of 'the miraculous.'

Dr. Harris urges Modernists to remember that the mechanistic Naturalism of the Nineteenth Century is now obsolete; Haldane, Ward, Driesch, and Bergson are all referred to as authorities. But so far as Modernists are concerned, Dr. Harris is slaying the slain—they are as well acquainted as he is with the New Biology and the New Psychology. What they fail to perceive is how traditional views of the miraculous can be reinstated under cover of this new scientific orientation. We have ourselves with some care perused a good deal of the literature of the New Biology, but we have discovered no indications that scientists propose to return to those ideas of the 'supernatural' which were formerly considered an integral part of the Christian religion. If we understand Dr. Harris aright, our own views in certain respects are not so very different from his; but we do not flatter ourselves that Dr. Paley would have found them congenial. The old conceptions of 'miracle' which our grandfathers held have disappeared for good. We may admit the possibility, and even the occurrence, of levitations, visions, clairvoyances, faith-healings, and so forth—but these phenomena are no longer 'miracles' in the traditional sense of the word; and to represent them as being so is to be guilty of obscuring the issue by a misuse of language.

In this connection it is not without interest to observe that in referring to the historicity of the *stigmata* of St. Francis (which perhaps few Modernists would think of disputing), Dr. Harris makes no reference whatever to Mr. J. M. Thompson's interesting Appendix to his *Miracles in the New Testament*, where he traces the gradual process of elaboration and materialisation which the historical *stigmata* underwent; although Mr. Thompson's book is carefully censured in the same chapter (pp. 183f.). The Franciscan parallels have indeed not yet been faced by Dr. Harris' friends, and neither Mr. Coulton nor Mr. Thompson has yet been satisfactorily answered, so far as we are aware.

The chapter on *Modernism and Biblical Criticism,* which dismisses a number of difficult and technical problems in some thirty pages, strikes us as disappointing. Ten pages of casual and hasty argument are sufficient to establish the following dogmatic proposition:

> 'The principles of criticism now generally accepted require us to regard it [the Fourth Gospel] as the first-hand work of John the son of Zebedee, as the unanimous tradition declares it.' (p. 214).

The Church indeed owes a debt of gratitude to Dr. Harris for thus peremptorily solving a difficult problem in a manner so favourable to tradition; though some regret will be felt that space did not allow him to display his proofs at greater length. We look in vain for any exami-

nation of the literature of the subject beyond a few cursory references, and these almost entirely relegated to an appendix. Dr. James Drummond is indeed referred to, but we were not aware that scholars attach final importance to his work in this controversy. The opinion of living scholars like W. R. Inge, E. F. Scott, and Latimer Jackson (if Loisy and Schmiedel seem too radical) would carry more weight to-day.

The chapter on Biblical Criticism contains no adequate treatment of the Synoptic problem, vital as this is to the wider problem of the actual historical basis of our religion. The authorship of *Luke* and *Acts* is passed over without discussion 'since the adhesion of Harnack and other liberals to the traditional view' (p. 204) renders it unnecessary. Yet anyone at all in touch with recent opinion is aware that this newly-accepted historicity of the earlier chapters of *Acts* raises more problems for traditionalism than it solves. Why is St. Peter's Christology in *Acts* i-xii so inadequate? Why were these first Christians contented with such a meagre theology? If the discourses which St. John has preserved for us were still ringing in their ears, why did the Apostles allow no traces of them to appear in their earliest preaching? Was the teaching of Jesus preserved in the Fourth Gospel esoteric? Dr. Harris sheds no light on these questions.

In fact we find it very difficult to believe that Dr. Harris is treating us seriously. Especially is this so when he suggests that modern English criticism of the New Testament documents becomes worthless because fantastic views were held by some German scholars in the nineteenth century on the authorship of the *Iliad* and the *Odyssey*. So flagrant a *non-sequitur* is hard to condone.

The same combination of slightness and pretentiousness is seen in a nine-page refutation of Dr. Rashdall's *Bampton Lectures*. The refutation, we need hardly add, will impress no one who has read the Dean's Lectures.

Dr. Harris does not hesitate to appeal to ecclesiastical prejudices. The following is an unpleasing example of this:

> 'As a typical example of "the drift to the left" in Christology we may instance Dr. Bethune-Baker, who, as Lady Margaret Professor of Divinity at Cambridge, is entrusted with the responsible task of instructing candidates for ordination in Christian Doctrine. In his case we see a steady and most lamentable declension from full orthodoxy. . . .' (p. 317).

The allusion to ordination candidates might serve in a letter to the *Church Times*, but in a work which claims to represent serious scholarship it is unworthy.

Did space permit we should like to append an anthology of theological curiosities culled from these pages. But we suspect that our readers are already weary of Dr. Harris. Yet we cannot resist the temptation to transcribe two:

> 'It is a great venture of faith possible only by the help of grace, to believe that the Almighty Ruler of the universe has humbled Himself to become man in the person of Jesus of Nazareth, and to die on the cross' (p. 21).

Here Tertullian would recognise in Dr. Harris a modern Praxeas, 'who crucified the Father.'

Again, we shudder to imagine both the strength and range of St. Jerome's invective had his eye caught the following pronouncement of Dr. Harris, and had he understood its significance:

> 'There is no evidence whatever that "the resurrection of the flesh" (or even of "this flesh," a phrase also used in early times) was ever understood in a materialistic sense' (p. 274). J. C. HARDWICK.

CONSTRUCTIVE MODERNISM.*

Mr. Rawlinson believes that the future lies with the Modernist, but he is conscious that the name as he uses it needs careful definition, if misunderstandings are to be avoided. Modernism is not to be identified with any form of 'attenuated Protestantism.' This volume is an attempt to put forward his point of view. It consists of five lectures delivered at Cambridge in the present year, at the request of the Cambridge branch of the Student Christian Movement, to which have been added two papers published originally in *The Pilgrim*.

The five lectures deal respectively with Catholicism, Episcopacy, Sacraments, Inspiration, Atonement. To read the book is to be reminded forcibly of the almost forgotten atmosphere of a university lecture room. The lecturer's views are set forth with such unmistakable clearness of expression that one feels that even the undergraduate whose theological aspirations soared no higher than Group D., would be able to take intelligent notes of what he heard, while the gaps, if any, occasioned by momentary inattention, could be filled up by reference to a Bible Dictionary on the night before the examination.

Mr. Rawlinson's Modernism is of the all-inclusive variety. A desire for comprehensiveness and a pleasantly complacent satisfaction with his own position, coupled, be it added, with a kindly tolerance of the opinions of others, are the characteristic notes of the book. The Modernism of the future will be of 'the Liberal, Evangelical, Catholic type.' Could the desire to include everybody within the circle of an all-embracing charity go further than that? Not of course that we are out of sympathy with Mr. Rawlinson's ideal, but the apparent suggestion that it can all be done with a wave of the hand again reflects an acquaintance with the lecture room rather than with the actual practical problems of parish or diocese.

Mr. Rawlinson deals kindly with the Sects, but the note of Anglican complacency is clearly sounded in the comfortable dictum that 'on the broader issues the 'Great Church' was apt to be more right than wrong, and the small sects . . . were apt to be more wrong than right.' Again, while glancing disapprovingly at the less reputable side of the Church's record, Mr. Rawlinson is quite unable to believe that 'the Christian Church as a whole has been suffered to go fundamentally astray in such a fashion as to misconceive the true nature and implications of its own religion.' On the other hand Mr. Rawlinson does not believe in infallibilities, whether of the Bible or of the Church, and we are left with the impression that in his view of the Spirit's activities he stands somewhere midway between the ethically monstrous conception of Mr. N. P. Williams that the Holy Spirit forces men to the unconscious doing of His will, leaving them just sufficient scope to maintain the illusion of freedom, and the somewhat indeterminate 'Divine Overruling' postulated by the late Dr. Sanday.

The review of the development of Episcopacy is ably done. No extravagant claims are made for the Divine origin of the Threefold Ministry, but we are asked to regard the whole framework as 'the permanent gift of the Divine Spirit to the Church.' Apart from any theory as to its origin, Mr. Rawlinson sees in the acceptance of Episcopacy the essential condition of a united Church.

The chapter on Sacraments opens with a convincing exposition of the meaning of the sacramental principle. We must think of the greater sacraments of Christianity as 'effectual channels of the grace of God,

* *Studies in Historical Christianity.* By A. E. J. Rawlinson, B.D. (Student Christian Movement, 1922. Price 4/- net; in paper covers 2/6.)

and not merely aids to the imagination, symbols of corporate aspiration, or potent occasions of spiritual self-suggestion.' But here, too, as with Episcopacy, Mr. Rawlinson is far less concerned with origin than with validity. The Catechism, with its reference to two sacraments 'generally necessary to salvation' and 'ordained by Christ Himself,' is frankly thrown over. 'The sacraments are to be interpreted not in the light of their historical origins (about which, in most cases, to be frank, we know singularly little), but rather in the light of what they have come to be, and of the part which they have actually played in the life of the Church.' This is admirably said, but how many of the Bishops who drew up the Lambeth Basis of Reunion would show a like open-mindedness? Mr. Rawlinson's candid utterance to the effect that in his view the episode of Acts viii, 14 ff., ought not to be regarded as historically the origin of Confirmation, 'except in the limited sense that the Anglican service of Confirmation is obviously modelled upon it as a sort of biblical precedent,' would, if accepted by the majority of clergy, entail a rather drastic revision of a good many first Confirmation classes.

If Mr. Rawlinson is likely to fall foul of the Anglo-Catholic for his views on the origin of sacraments, it is not improbable that many Evangelicals may be deterred by his opinions on the Bible from accepting with any degree of alacrity the vision of glorious comprehensiveness which he seeks to portray. The predictive element in Prophecy practically goes by the board, and the conception of inspiration is so enlarged as to emphasise the Divine activity in the world of ordinary happenings, and to destroy outright the hard and fast line still too frequently drawn between inspiration sacred and profane, and between inspiration in Bible times and now.

The lecture on the Atonement is perhaps the best of the series, stressing as it does the vitally important consideration of the cost of sin not only to the sinner but to the one sinned against. A doctrine of God's free grace in forgiveness, valuable as this undoubtedly is, yet falls short of the reality, if the impression be given that God's pardon of the sinner is a light-hearted or easy matter. In the Cross we see the eternal proof of 'the inherent costliness of the Divine forgiveness of human sin.' Sin must be seen as involving consequences for God as well as for man, and the death of Christ must be thought of not merely as the death of a martyr in a great cause, but as 'the supreme Divine Act for the redemption of man.' Unless, however, Christ is 'in some sense God' such a view of the crucifixion is an impossibility. W. MAURICE PRYKE.

PRACTICAL MYSTICISM.*

The public, having learned a certain amount about the mystics, and having been attracted by them, is anxious, if the path is not too stony, to tread in their footsteps. Mr. Hubbard's 'book of elementary instructions' will be an excellent help by the way. It is free from neurotic, or erotic, pietism; it is devoid of sentimentality; it is practical; and, in a word, Christian.

Though we should like to quote more freely, we shall confine ourselves to two passages which seem to us to recommend a type of religion which, for lack of a better word, may be called *humane*. The first speaks of *the* tragedy of life—the atrophy of the spirituality of childhood :—

> 'One of the saddest things about adolescence is that it so often means the gradual loss of the imaginative faculty. Nine people out of ten are materialists for this reason alone. As children they possessed a keen imagination. . . . For the majority, each year as it passes means the closing of more doorways of the spirit, until

* *Self-Training in Mysticism*, by the Rev. H. L. Hubbard, M.A. Christophers. 4/6 net.

at last they come to regard the world of men and affairs as the only reality.'

Both Wordsworth and Schopenhauer, geniuses of two very different faiths, have said the same thing. How can the transition be made from the religion of the child to the religion of the adult? We suppose the only means are that the adult should retain certain characteristics of the child—sincerity, sympathy, curiosity, eagerness, imagination, seriousness, lightness of touch, and so on. Can it be done? *Quae impossibilia sunt apud homines, possibilia sunt apud Deum.*

Mr. Hubbard wisely reminds his readers that the spiritual gifts they covet are the same in kind as the sympathetic insight which can understand the hearts of others, and which some religious people hardly think it worth while to cultivate.

> 'Insight comes by sympathy, and sympathy is born of love. . . . In every conversation, try to get inside the mind of your companion. It will become quite natural to you to realise exactly what is passing in the minds of other people. . . . Walk the streets when a crowd of people are abroad. Walk with all your spiritual faculties alert, and you will find a strange exhilaration filling the innermost recesses of your being.'

Epictetus has a passage to the same effect :—

> 'If you light on a crowd—a grand assembly, a festival—endeavour to share in the festival with the rest of the world. For what sight is more pleasant to a lover of mankind than a great number of men?'

'Fellowship is Heaven, the lack of it is Hell.' We need something of this robust humanity in our religion, and if we are not *of* the world, we should at least be *in* it. A mysticism which dwells apart and cannot retain a sense of God in the society of human beings is not Christian. The Christian mystic is rather of the number of those,

> 'Who carry music in their heart,
> Through dusty lane and wrangling mart,
> Plying their daily task with busier feet
> Because their souls a secret strain repeat.'

We need a religion that can make us see with our eyes and understand with our hearts, and cause us to cry with Miranda :

> 'O, wonder!
> How many goodly creatures are there here!
> How beauteous mankind is! O brave new world,
> That hath such people in't!'

J.C.H.

CORRESPONDENCE

IS MODERNISM CHRISTIAN?

SIR, TO THE EDITOR OF *The Modern Churchman.*

There are many members of Christian churches who conscientiously believe that Modernism is destroying the foundations of the Christian Faith. My own belief is exactly the contrary.

Before making up our minds on the question, it is necessary to enquire what is the Christian faith.

To deserve that name it must be based on the teaching of our Lord; and, as such, must be subjected to one all-important test, *viz.* that it exhibits a direct bearing on the elevation of man's spiritual and moral ideals, and in consequence on the uplifting of his everyday life.

It is hardly necessary to set forth proofs that Christ confined his religious teaching to this one aim. When he was asked: 'Are there

few that be saved,' his reply was: 'Strive ye to enter in at the straight gate.' He did not enlighten his hearers on speculative questions, though doubtless many such were put to him. He only laid down principles and precepts which bear directly on human life.

Let us then examine Modernism, keeping in view this main principle in Christianity.

It was, until comparatively recent times, the teaching of most schools of orthodox Christianity that although we must believe in a good and all-powerful God, yet we must also believe that He condemns to everlasting punishment people who have sinned against Him, and have not in this world repented, or looked to Christ for salvation.

Now the point before us is whether this, or the Modernist view, is the more conducive to a noble and spiritual life. Such must depend on God for inspiration, and must trust in Him as just and holy; but is this possible for one who believes in the commonly taught doctrine of everlasting punishment for the individual sinner? Is the spreading among the heathen of the doctrine of everlasting punishment something that will improve their lives? The modernist is quite willing to believe that Christ taught punishment to be aeonian; *i.e.* he taught that through all the ages, as well as in the present age, those who violate God's law will suffer for the violation. But this is a different thing from believing, what many professing Christians seem even still to believe, that there is no repentance beyond the grave, and that errors unrepented of in this life are punished throughout all ages.

To take another so-called Christian orthodox doctrine, *viz.* that man's sins are forgiven because an innocent victim died on Calvary—Is this teaching, or the Modernist view, the more likely to uplift human life? The modernist believes that our Lord lived a perfect life and died an undeserved death, and that the same Holy Spirit which wrought out that perfect 'at-one-ment' in him, is present with us; but he does not believe that God could not forgive sinners without the sacrifice of an innocent person, nor can he see how such a mode of forgiveness could become efficient for the sins of the millions of human beings who lived and died in the pre-Christian ages of the world.

It does help men upward to believe that repented sins are forgiven, and that the Holy Spirit which dwelt perfectly in Christ, and enabled Him to live the perfect God-like life, will help us too: but a method of forgiveness which violates the fundamental human sense of justice cannot have a sanctifying effect.

Let us next consider the oft-discussed question in early Christian and modern times of the personality of our Lord.

What the Modernist is contending for is that Christ shall be recognised as really human, a doctrine which the creeds aimed at expressing, but which is largely lost sight of in the teaching of many Christians at the present day.

For Christ to be really a man, he must be a man in his entire nature, that is to say in his divinely-human nature. If there is no correspondence between the Divine in Christ, and the Divine in man, then the life of Christ, and the resurrection of Christ have no meaning, no lesson for mankind. If there is no Divinity in man, such as was perfectly manifested in Christ, then Christ can be no example for human life. The life which he lived would be something quite impossible for man even to try to copy. And if Christ were not really a man in his divinely-human nature, then, though Christ could rise from the grave, there would be no guarantee in his resurrection that a being essentially different from him

can live again. So that in both these respects the modernist view tends more to the elevation of human life than the more common teaching to which I have referred. It gives man hope of attainment, through the aid of God's Holy Spirit, towards a life such as Christ lived perfectly; and it gives him hope that because of the Divine nature in himself, he can live and dwell after death in the presence of God. Christ is the Light of the World, because through him all men could come to the realisation that each human being is heir to the privileges and hopes of a real child of God.

Such a view does not derogate in any degree from the wonder, greatness, and dignity of the personality of Jesus Christ, but it does bring out what it was always our Lord's desire to emphasise, that man has a divine origin, a noble mission, and a hopeful future.

On the question of the infallibility of certain Christian dogmas, the modernist positon is nearer that of Christ than is that of the orthodox R.C., many low Churchmen, and the majority of high Churchmen. The first believes in the infallibility of Papal decrees when uttered *ex cathedra*, the second class hold the Bible to be infallible, the last regard as such the decisions of the oecumenical councils (*see* the Declaration of Faith recently addressed to the oecumenical patriarch by the E.C.U., in which occur the words, 'we hold that the decrees of the Councils which have been accepted as oecumenical are incontrovertible, and binding on all Christians.').

The modernist on the contrary believes that truth is 'contained in' all the above, but he does not believe in the inerrancy of the Pope when speaking *ex cathedra*, or of Holy Scripture, or of oecumenical councils, and he thinks that in this view he is in accord with the teaching of Him who promised that the Holy Spirit would lead His disciples into all truth, and that if we continue in His word, we shall know the truth.

My claim is that this modernist view tends more than infallibility theories to elevate spiritual life, because it makes men fall back on the Holy Spirit, and work with that Spirit in deeds, and a life of righteousness, knowing that thus and thus only will spiritual truth be attained, instead of resting on an external authority which may violate reason and conscience, and drive educated and sincere men into indifference, or opposition, to the Christian faith.

These are but a few instances in which it seems to me clear that the modernist attitude is more Christ-like than that of other schools of thought, and that it is more likely to-day to make Christianity a reality. Modernists are not infallible, nor do they claim to be infallible; but they do claim that it is their most earnest desire to learn the truth, and to interpret that never-ceasing revelation of God which has been given in the Holy Scriptures, in the thoughts of men, and in the workings of the laws of Nature and History.

Such an attitude will make educated men and women more keen to support a right kind of missionary work. It will also make our own personal faith more strong and God-trusting.

And I believe, from a fairly wide acquaintance with the feelings and wishes of leaders in the Eastern Churches, it will do far more to bring about brotherly feeling between them and us than any strained attempt to draw up a fixed code of faith based on decisions of the fourth century.

What the East wants, and expects us to aid in supplying, is a solution of the many religious difficulties which the increase of modern knowledge has created in the religious sphere.

BERESFORD POTTER
(*Archdeacon of Cyprus*)